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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1957
On the basis of Section 108 of the Restatement of Property, the
common pleas court construed the gift of an undivided half-interest to
the son as only a life estate, though the will failed 'to expressly so limit
this gift. As to the disposition of the realty other than -the residence,
the common pleas court implied from the language of the codicil, which
expressly related to the residence, a .gift of a remainder to the son con-
tingent upon his surviving T's widow with another contingent remainder
to the son's issue if the son predeceased Ts widow. 28 The son did pre-
decease T's widow survived by a son and daughter. The common pleas
court held .that the issue of Ts son, upon the death of T's son, took
indefeasibly vested remainders and therefore they did not have to survive
the life tenant.29
ROBE3RT N. COOK
In Unger v. Guarantee Reserve Life Insurance Company,1 recovery
was sought under a group "School Child Accident Policy." Deceased-
insured was standing outside the garage at his home and behind the
family automobile when his father in starting the automobile, with the
intent of driving him to school, struck and killed him. The question in
the case was whether deceased was as yet "en route between the home
and* the school," that is, does the word "home" refer to the house in
which deceased resided or to the entire residential premises. The ma-
jority of the court, under the doctrine that ambiguous words in an in-
surance 'policy are to be construed against the company, held that only the
house was referred to and that -therefore deceased was "en route." Judge
Zimmerman, dissenting, said that there was no ambiguity and that a rea-
sonable construction of the language required that deceased's conduct be
recognized as preparation to depart for school. "Home" is broader than
"house" and embraces the entire residential estate. "Ordinarily an incident
happens en route when it occurs after departure from one place and dur-
ing progress to another. It is difficult to comprehend how an individual
can be between two places when he is at one of them."2
In Yeager v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.,3 the court -had to
construe an accident and sickness disability insurance policy. Plaintiff
had admittedly been accidentally injured and had been paid benefits on
SSMES Am SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 581 (2d ed. 1956); RE-
STATEMENT, PROPERTY § 252 (1940). But cf. Monroe v. Leckey, supra n. 17.
mSIMEs AND SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 581 (2d ed. 1956); RE-
STATEMENT, PROPERTY § 252, comment f (1940).
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that basis. Later, following a fourteen month period of work, he stopped
work because of continuing difficulties from the injury. The defendant
insurance company then offered to pay at the sickness rate which was
lower. Plaintiff refused to accept that settlement and sued to recover
at the accident rate. During the interval period when he had worked,
plaintiff had worked almost full time, had put in some overtime, had
performed almost all of the essential functions of the job assigned to him
but had had some material help from fellow workmen (which help
was not violative of the rule of the employer). The -insurance contract
provided 'that to receive accident benefits the injury must "wholly and
continuously disable the insured [plaintiff] and prevent him from per-
forming every duty pertaining to his occupation." The court held that
-this required injury which prevented plaintiff from performing each and
every duty pertaining to his occupation rather than an injury which
prevented him from performing only a few such duties. The court ac-
cepted the argument that in case of ambiguity an insurance policy must
be construed against the company but found no ambiguity.
In Shepard v. Espy,4 decedent had taken out insurance on his own life
and designated the woman with whom 'he was living as the beneficiary.
The woman so named was lawfully married to another man. However,
the insured caused the beneficiary line on the application to be filled in
with "Alice Karns, wife." After the death of the insured, 'the insurance
company paid the face value to the named beneficiary. The administra-
trix of the estate sued and pleaded in the alternative that the beneficiary
be declared 'to hold the money in trust or that the insurance company be
required to make payment to the administratrix. The court of appeals
held that the trial court was correct in sustaining a demurrer to the entire
petition. The beneficiary who received the money was dearly the per-
son specified 'by the insured. Any fraud practiced on the insurance
company was not available to the administratrix as a basis for this action
and had been waived by the insurance company.
A "Mercantile Burglary, Robbery, Fraud Policy" of insurance in
Serves v. Eureka Casualty Company5 provided for cancellation "by five
days' written notice mailed to the insured . . . stating when thereafter
such cancellation shall be effective .... The evidence established that
a notice cancelling the policy in suit was mailed. Insured denied receiv-
ing it. From a verdict -for plaintiff-insured the Company appealed con-
166 Ohio St. 409, 142 N.E.2d 857 (1957).
Id. at 412, 142 N.E.2d at 859.
166 Ohio St. 71, 139 N.E.2d 48 (1956).
'142 N.E.2d 238 (Ohio C. App. 1957).
'103 Ohio App. 268, 144 N.E.2d 120 (1957).
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tending that the trial court erred in requiring proof that -the notice had
been received. The court of appeals upheld -the trial court in this con-
tention saying: "If the insured is to have five days' written notice of
cancellation by the company, it follows that, for the insured to have such
five days' notice, he must receive the notice of cancellation." There was
no provision in the policy that mailing of the notice would -be the
equivalent of actual receipt by the insured.
In Scott v. Continental Assurance Co.,6 plaintiff had two policies with
defendant Company which had been obtained through Russell, an agent
of the Company. Plaintiff then entered into a contract at the agent's
instigation whereby he supposedly contracted with the Company to pre-
pay the premiums for seven years. This action by the agent was com-
pletely without the Company's knowledge or authority. The checks
whereby plaintiff sought to prepay the premiums were made payable to
,the agent and cashed -by him, and the money received therefor retained
by him. Plaintiff sought to recover that sum of money from the Com-
pany. The court of appeals held that no recovery could be had. Both
policies provided for .payment of premiums at the home office and for
issuance of receipts therefrom. Both provided that a "change in 'premium
can be made only by written request of .the insured upon a form pre-
scribed by the Company." The policies were in the possession of the
plainfiff. Plaintiff "relied on the obvious lack of authority of Russell in
attempting to bind his Company by this so-called 'premium deposit
fund' collateral agreement."7  "It was Russell who betrayed his friend.
The Company knew nothing of Russell's perfidy."S Plaintiff relied upon
Ohio Revised Code section 3911.22 which makes a solicitor an agent of
the company. This argument was rejected by the court on the ground
that the statute "does not convert an agent with limited power into a
general agent possessing unlimited power." The "premium deposit fund"
arrangement was an attempted new contract, subsequently made and vio-
lative of the express terms of the policies.
In Lynd v. Sandy & Beaver Valley Farmers Mutual Insurance Co.,9
the court held that a plaintiff who is seeking to recover on an insurance
policy, fails to sustain his -burden of proof when he does not introduce
the policy into evidence or explain the impossibility of doing so and
the terms of the policy. This is a generally accepted but seldom litigated
principle.
EDGAR I. KING
'144 N.E.2d 904 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
1Id., at 906.
'Id., at 907.
'103 Ohio App. 408, 145 N.E.2d 453 (1957).
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